William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 32 | Issue 3

Article 1

2006

The Supreme Court's Attack on Domestic Violence
Legislation—Discretion, Entitlement, and Due
Process in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales
Kathleen K. Curtis

Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Recommended Citation
Curtis, Kathleen K. (2006) "The Supreme Court's Attack on Domestic Violence Legislation—Discretion, Entitlement, and Due
Process in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 32: Iss. 3, Article 1.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss3/1

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Curtis: The Supreme Court's Attack on Domestic Violence Legislation—Discr
15CURTIS.DOC

4/5/2006 1:36:54 PM

COMMENT: THE SUPREME COURT’S ATTACK ON
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LEGISLATION—DISCRETION,
ENTITLEMENT, AND DUE PROCESS IN TOWN OF
CASTLE ROCK V. GONZALES
Kathleen K. Curtis†
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 1182
II. DEVELOPMENT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PREVENTION
STATUTES ............................................................................. 1184
A. Intimate Abuse: The Silent Crisis...................................... 1184
1. Law Enforcement Lacks a Framework to Respond to
Domestic Abuse.......................................................... 1184
2. Development of Civil Protection Orders to Combat
Domestic Abuse.......................................................... 1186
3. Litigation Catalyzed Increased Enforcement of
Protection Orders ....................................................... 1187
B. Mandatory Arrest and Prosecution Laws .......................... 1189
1. The Duluth Model ..................................................... 1190
2. Mandatory Arrest ...................................................... 1190
3. No-Drop Prosecution Policies ...................................... 1191
III. HISTORY OF JESSICA GONZALES’S CLAIM ............................. 1192
A. Factual and Procedural Background ................................ 1192
B. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals’ Analysis ................... 1195
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION....................................... 1199
A. Assault on Mandatory Enforcement Provisions ................. 1200
B. Refusal to Recognize an Entitlement ................................. 1203
V. IMPACT ON INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
DOMESTIC ABUSE LEGISLATION .......................................... 1207
A. Interpretation of Mandatory Enforcement Provisions ......... 1207
1. Early Decisions Following Town of Castle Rock........ 1208
2. Hope in District Court’s Divergence from Town of
Castle Rock ............................................................. 1209

† J.D. Candidate 2007, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A., magna cum
laude, English Literature, Concordia College, 2004. The author extends her
thanks to Bill and Colleen Curtis for their encouragement and support.

1181

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006

1

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 1
15CURTIS.DOC

1182

4/5/2006 1:36:54 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:3

3. Future of Minnesota’s Domestic Abuse Act .................. 1211
B. Civil Remedies for Failure to Enforce Protective Orders....... 1212
VI.
CONCLUSION ................................................................ 1214
I.

INTRODUCTION

In a just society, we pledge to act together to ensure that
each individual is safe from harm. In a just society, we
support individuals in systems that are working to protect
victims and to prevent the violence. In a just society, we
support the professionals who are trying to stop the
violence. In a just society, we come together with a
common goal of making sure that everyone is safe. In a
just society—I think we have to say this over and over and
over—we are not going to tolerate the violence and we are
going to be a part of the fundamental change of attitude
1
that is going to stop the cycle of violence.
The late Minnesota Senator Paul Wellstone and his wife Sheila
were passionate advocates for ending domestic violence both in
Minnesota and throughout the nation. Senator Wellstone played a
key role in the passage of federal legislation such as the Violence
2
Against Women Act, while his wife Sheila spoke extensively about
3
the importance of ending violence in the home. Minnesota has
long been a state on the leading edge of innovative solutions to
4
domestic violence issues. A 1984 study conducted in Minneapolis
compared the effectiveness of mandatory arrest to the traditional
police methods of mediating the dispute or making the abuser

1. Sheila Wellstone, Address at the Hennepin County Medical Center (Oct.
25, 1995), available at http://www.wellstone.org/swininstitute/news_archive.aspx
(follow “Sheila Wellstone Speaking About Domestic Violence, 1995” hyperlink).
2. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 190255 (1994) (codified as amended in U.S.C. titles 8, 16, 28, 42).
3. Jeffrey L. Edleson & Oliver J. Williams, In Memory of Paul and Sheila
Wellstone, 9 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 139, 142 (2003), available at
http://www.mincava.umn.edu/wellstone.shtml.
4. See Mary E. Asmus et al., Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth:
Developing Effective Prosecution Strategies from Understanding the Dynamics of Abusive
Relationships, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 115, 136-37 (1991) (discussing the Duluth study);
Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Minneapolis Domestic Violence
Experiment,
POLICE
FOUNDATION
REPORTS
(1984),
available
at
http://www.policefoundation.org (follow “Publications” hyperlink; then follow
“Electronic Library” hyperlink; then follow “The Minneapolis Domestic Violence
Experiment” hyperlink).
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5

leave the house for a period of time. The study concludes that
arrests most effectively prevent further domestic violence and it
became a catalyst for a shift in national policy, including a
recommendation from the U.S. Attorney General that mandatory
6
arrest should be the standard policy for law enforcement officials.
Today, Minnesota is one of thirty-one states that mandate arrest
7
upon violation of a domestic violence protection order.
The enforcement of laws mandating arrest for violation of
restraining orders suffered a severe setback, however, with the
8
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales.
Jessica Gonzales brought a claim against the Town of Castle Rock,
Colorado after police failed to enforce a restraining order against
9
her husband. The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit’s
holding and ruled that the protective order issued by a Colorado
judge pursuant to state statute did not create an entitlement to
10
which due process protections attach.
Domestic violence
advocates in Colorado and across the country have responded to
the decision with great concern, citing it as an invitation for the
11
legal system to once again ignore domestic violence crimes.
In the effort to avoid imposing section 1983 liability on the
Town of Castle Rock, the Court took an unnecessary step. The
Court ruled that Gonzales did not have an entitlement to
protection because the mandate in the Colorado statute was
necessarily discretionary in terms of the enforcement actions
12
required of police. That determination is not only contrary to
existing jurisprudence on the interpretation of mandatory statutory
language, but it is also contrary to the legislative intent that drove
mandatory language in statutes to prevent domestic violence.

5. See Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of
Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1669 (2004) (examining the
Minneapolis police study).
6. Id.
7. Brief Amici Curiae of National Network to End Domestic Violence et al.
in Support of Respondent at 12-13, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct.
2796 (2005) (No. 04-278), 2005 WL 353608 (citing MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd.
14 (2002)).
8. 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005).
9. Id. at 2800.
10. Id. at 2810-11.
11. Sarah M. Buel, For Battered Women, a Chilling Court Ruling, AUSTIN AMSTATESMAN, July 15, 2005, at A15, available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/news/
2005/071505_buel.html.
12. Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2806.
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This Comment analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in light
of the critical impact it will have on domestic violence statutes
across the nation. First, the Comment examines the development
13
of strict domestic violence statutes throughout the country. Next,
it explores the particular history of Jessica Gonzales’s claim against
Castle Rock and the claim’s disposition through the Tenth
14
Circuit.
The Comment then scrutinizes the Supreme Court’s
decision in light of the current domestic violence legislation’s goal
15
of moving away from police discretion.
Finally, the Comment
concludes with an investigation of the potential impact that this
case will have on the interpretation and enforcement of
Minnesota’s Domestic Abuse Act and similar laws around the
16
country.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PREVENTION STATUTES
17

A. Intimate Abuse: The Silent Crisis

1. Law Enforcement Lacks a Framework to Respond to Domestic
Abuse
Spousal abuse has been a part of human society at least since
18
the Roman Empire. In early American culture, spousal abuse was
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part V.
17. The historical analysis presented in this section is provided merely to
understand the importance of the movement towards mandatory arrest and
prosecution policies. The history of intimate violence in human society has been
thoroughly studied by several authorities. See, e.g., LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF
THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE: BOSTON 18801960 (1988); LINDA MILLS, INSULT TO INJURY: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSES TO
INTIMATE ABUSE (2003); ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF
AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE
PRESENT (1987); SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND
STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT (1982). Additionally, the paper
refers to victims as female and perpetrators as male. That usage is not intended to
undermine the experience of men as victims or women as abusers, but to view
domestic abuse through the lens of Jessica Gonzales’s experience.
18. See Arthur L. Rizer III, Mandatory Arrest: Do We Need to Take a Closer Look?,
36 UWLA L. REV. 1, 2 (2005) (noting the phrase “rule of thumb” originated in the
Roman rule that a husband could beat his wife with a stick, so long as it was no
thicker than his thumb); Prentice L. White, Stopping the Chronic Batterer Through
Legislation: Will it Work This Time?, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 709, 714 (2004) (“In the year of
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generally accepted and excused as part of the husband’s right to
19
By the 1920s, spousal abuse had been
govern his home.
20
criminalized in all states.
However, marital rape was notably
21
Despite the widespread
excluded from criminalization.
criminalization of wife beating at the turn of the twentieth century,
the legal system remained largely unwilling to become involved in
22
domestic disputes.
Domestic violence, while recognized as criminal, was socially
tolerated as a private family matter well into the latter part of the
23
twentieth century. Reports of domestic abuse generally received
24
low priority from police departments. If police did respond to a
report of domestic abuse, they nonetheless were unlikely to make
25
an arrest. Few domestic abusers were ever actually arrested; of
26
those that were arrested, even fewer were ever prosecuted. The
legal system’s response to domestic abuse functioned not only to
ignore the victims of domestic violence but also to tacitly approve
27
of intimate abuse as part of American culture.
As the feminist movement began gaining ground on issues of
equal pay and reproductive rights, it also began to focus on the
28
social scourge of intimate abuse.
Survivors of domestic abuse
began organizing methods for women to escape abusive situations
29
without state involvement. That grassroots movement grew into

753 B.C., Ancient Rome created the Laws of Chastisement that permitted
husbands to strike their wives as a method of preventing the wife from exposing
her husband to criminal and civil liability.”).
19. See, e.g., Asmus et al., supra note 4, at 116 (describing nineteenth century
American court rulings that acknowledged a husband’s right to physically
“chastise” his wife). For a discussion of how American courts rationalized the
acceptability of spousal abuse, see State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 61-62 (1874).
20. Asmus et al., supra note 4, at 116 (examining the criminalization of
domestic abuse); Rizer, supra note 18, at 3-4 (same).
21. Rizer, supra note 18, at 4.
22. See, e.g., Sack, supra note 5, at 1661-62 (discussing the failure of law
enforcement to respond to domestic abuse).
23. Id. at 1662.
24. Id. at 1663.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1663-64.
27. See id. at 1664; see also Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic
Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 7 (1999) (describing unspoken acceptance of domestic violence
based on lack of law enforcement response).
28. See Sack, supra note 5, at 1666-67 (examining the feminist movement’s
role in domestic violence legislation).
29. Id. at 1666.
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an effort to effect systemic change.
2.

Development of Civil Protection Orders to Combat Domestic Abuse

One of the key legislative reforms advocated by the movement
to end violence against women was the use of civil protective
30
orders. Protective orders empower victims of domestic abuse to
31
Civil
begin the process of separating from their abusers.
protective orders also provide women some measure of relief from
32
abuse without pursuing criminal charges against her abuser. By
the mid-1990s, every state had enacted laws for civil protective
33
orders. Today, every state has civil protection orders tailored to
domestic violence cases, as well as criminal enforcement provisions
34
for protective order violations.
The federal government also
recognized the importance of civil protection orders as part of its
35
1994 Violence Against Women Act.
By 2002, every state had
enacted legislation criminalizing violations of civil protection
36
orders.
Critically important to the success of protective orders is their

30. Id. at 1667. For a discussion of the evolution of domestic violence policy
in Minnesota, see Asmus et al., supra note 4.
31. Sack, supra note 5, at 1667. The process of empowerment begins by
separating the victim from the abuser. See PETER FINN & SARAH COLSON, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS: LEGISLATION, CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND
ENFORCEMENT (1990), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/171666.pdf
(noting protection orders provide “[i]mmediate relief to domestic violence
victims”).
32. Finn & Colson, supra note 31, at 43. For a variety of reasons, women are
often reluctant to pursue criminal charges or leave their abusers. White, supra
note 18, at 720 (noting a variety of reasons her clients provided for choosing not
to leave their abusers). Victims may be financially dependent on their abusers
and, therefore, unwilling to jeopardize their source of familial income. Id. Some
women simply feel that leaving their abusers will ultimately increase the abuse. Id.
33. Sack, supra note 5, at 1667; see also Epstein, supra note 27, at 12 (discussing
civil protection orders).
34. Brief Amici Curiae of National Network to End Domestic Violence et al.,
supra note 7, at 12. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2004).
35. Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1902 (1994). “[T]hese laws condition state receipt of sizable federal funding on
the creation of systems that: (1) ensure that protection orders are given full faith
and credit by all sister states; (2) provide government assistance with service of
process in protection order cases; and (3) criminalize violations of protection
orders.” Epstein, supra note 27, at 12. The Supreme Court overruled portions of
VAWA in 2000 as beyond the scope of congressional commerce power. See United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
36. Sack, supra note 5, at 1667.
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37

enforcement. The majority of women seeking protective orders
38
After
do so only after repeated violence and serious threats.
obtaining an order, women are empowered to seek permanent
39
escape from a violent relationship.
Studies have found that
police-reported abuse decreased by eighty percent among battered
40
women with permanent protective orders. Protective orders that
are not enforced may create a dangerously false sense of security
41
for victims. Realistically, most abusers will not stop tormenting
their victims merely because a victim has an order directing the
abuser to do so; therefore, the effectiveness of protective orders
42
stems from their swift and certain enforcement.
3.

Litigation Catalyzed Increased Enforcement of Protection Orders

Initially, many police agencies remained reluctant to enforce
43
restraining orders in domestic abuse situations. A few key cases
created a strong incentive to enforce protective orders, however,
when courts determined that the respective city could be held
44
liable for failing to enforce protective orders.
Tracey Thurman suffered years of abuse before ultimately
45
obtaining a protective order against her husband in May 1983.
Twice during the month of May Thurman sought a warrant for her
husband’s arrest and on both occasions the Torrington,
46
Connecticut police instructed her to return later. On June 10,
37. See Finn & Colson, supra note 31, at 43 (noting lack of enforcement is a
serious limitation on the utility of protection orders).
38. Brief Amici Curiae of National Network to End Domestic Violence et al.,
supra note 7, at 24.
39. Id. at 24-25.
40. Id. at 25 (citing Victoria Holt et al., Civil Protection Orders and Risk of
Subsequent Police-Reported Violence, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 589, 593 (2002)).
41. Id. at 25-26.
42. Id. at 26; see also Adele Harrell & Barbara Smith, Effects of Restraining Orders
on Domestic Violence Victims, in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 214
(Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996), reprinted in LEGAL INTERVENTIONS IN
FAMILY VIOLENCE: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 49, 50-51 (Nat’l
Inst.
of
Justice
&
Am.
Bar
Ass’n
eds.,
1998),
available
at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/171666.pdf.
43. See Sack, supra note 5, at 1667-68.
44. See id. at 1667 (discussing Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp.
1521 (D. Conn. 1984)); see also Sorichetti ex rel. Sorichetti v. City of New York, 482
N.E.2d 70 (N.Y. 1985). But see Ricketts v. City of Columbia, 36 F.3d 775 (8th Cir.
1994) (refusing to recognize claims of domestic violence victims against the
police); McKee v. City of Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1989) (same).
45. Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1525.
46. Id. On May 27, Thurman was told by police to return on May 31, after
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1983, Thurman’s estranged husband came to her sister’s house
47
where she was staying and demanded to see her. When police
finally arrived, twenty-five minutes after Tracey Thurman called
them, they found Charles Thurman standing over his wife, who had
48
been repeatedly stabbed, holding a bloody knife. In the presence
of the police officer, Thurman kicked his wife in the head,
retrieved their small child from the house, and dropped him on his
49
mother’s bloody body. Only when Thurman threatened his wife
50
as she lay on the ambulance stretcher did police finally arrest him.
Tracey Thurman and a number of other women sued the City of
Torrington alleging that the police’s unofficial policy of
51
responding differently to domestic disputes violated the Equal
52
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The federal
district court concluded that Thurman and her co-plaintiffs had
53
alleged sufficient facts to support their claim.
A federal jury
ultimately awarded Thurman $2.3 million, forcing government
officials to finally recognize the importance of creating a
54
coordinated response to domestic violence.
Like Tracey Thurman, Josephine Sorichetti obtained a
55
protective order against her husband only after years of abuse.
When her husband threatened her and her infant daughter Dina as
Josephine delivered Dina for a court-ordered visitation, Josephine
56
immediately reported the threat to police.
The next day, a
lieutenant with whom Josephine spoke informed her that the
57
protection order was “‘only a piece of paper’” that meant nothing.
Later that evening, after Sorichetti had filed her complaint, Frank
Sorichetti’s sister found Dina severely injured after her father had
attacked her with a fork, knife, and screwdriver, and had attempted

Memorial Day weekend. On May 31, she was told that the only police officer who
could help her was on vacation. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1525-26.
49. Id. at 1526.
50. Id.
51. The plaintiffs alleged that police took domestic disturbance calls less
seriously than they did reports of stranger violence. Id.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
53. Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1526.
54. Sack, supra note 5, at 1667-68 (discussing the Thurman case).
55. Sorichetti ex rel. Sorichetti v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d 70, 72 (N.Y.
1985).
56. Id. at 73.
57. Id.
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58

to saw off her leg.
Josephine Sorichetti commenced a lawsuit
against New York City for the police’s failure to enforce the terms
59
of the protective order following her husband’s threats.
The
court held that the protective order, coupled with the police’s
knowledge of her husband’s prior abuse, created a special
60
relationship between Sorichetti and the police.
The police
therefore were obligated to respond to Sorichetti’s request for
61
help. A jury awarded Sorichetti $2 million, providing yet another
wake-up call to officials who had failed to create an effective system
62
for responding to reports of domestic abuse.
Despite the significant legislative and judicial responses to
domestic abuse through protective order statutes, the criminal
justice system remained reluctant to take action. Among police
and prosecutors, domestic violence was perceived as a family
63
problem in which the government should not interfere.
Advocates thus had to seek alternative means of addressing the
domestic violence crisis in American culture.
B. Mandatory Arrest and Prosecution Laws
Legislators responded to the perceived reluctance of police
and prosecutors to become involved in domestic abuse situations by
limiting prosecutorial and police discretion. Mandatory arrest and
64
“no-drop” prosecution policies were developed to ensure intimate
abuse received the same response from law enforcement as
65
stranger violence. Some of the most significant research that led
58. Id. at 74.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 75.
61. Id. at 76.
62. Sack, supra note 5, at 1668 (discussing the Sorichetti suit).
63. See Epstein, supra note 27, at 13 (examining the apathy of the criminal
justice system towards domestic violence).
64. No-drop policies essentially require prosecutors to pursue criminal
charges against domestic abusers, regardless of whether the victim cooperates with
the prosecution. Sack, supra note 5, at 1672. This approach developed to
encourage arrests because police are more likely to arrest offenders if they think
the offender may be prosecuted. Id. at 1673. Additionally, it reduced the risk that
a batterer could intimidate his victim into not pressing charges because the
decision of whether to pursue the case was outside the control of the victim. Id.
That disempowerment of the victim in the prosecution process is one of the chief
criticisms of no-drop policies. Id. at 1681. For a critique of mandatory arrest and
prosecution policies, see Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the
Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 595 (1999).
65. The Minnesota Legislature passed the Domestic Abuse Act in 1979. 1979
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to these aggressive responses to domestic abuse originated in
Minnesota.
1.

The Duluth Model

A key 1982 experiment utilizing a multi-agency approach to
66
respond to domestic abuse occurred in Duluth, Minnesota. The
“Duluth Model” coordinated the responses of police, corrections
officers, probation officers, prosecutors, judges, human services
67
providers, and victim advocates in domestic abuse cases.
The
result of the coordinated response was an increased arrest and
prosecution rate and a high participation rate in abuser
68
rehabilitation programs.
The Duluth Model is now utilized
69
internationally to quell domestic violence.
2.

Mandatory Arrest

The Minneapolis police department conducted a
groundbreaking experiment in 1984 regarding police responses to
70
domestic abuse. Researchers Lawrence W. Sherman and Richard
A. Berk developed an experiment in which police officers
responding to domestic violence calls would handle the call in one
of three ways, randomly determined prior to the officer’s arrival at
71
the scene. The officers could arrest the abuser, send the abuser
away from the home for a period of time, or attempt to mediate the
72
dispute. Abusers who were arrested had a ten percent re-offense
rate within a six-month period, while those who were sent away
73
The
from the home had a twenty-four percent repeat rate.
researchers concluded that mandatory arrests were more effective
Minn Laws c. 214, § 1 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2004)). The Act
mandated police to arrest batterers and provided other tools for effective state
intervention. Asmus et al., supra note 4, at 125-26.
66. The program is called the Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention Project.
Asmus et al., supra note 4, at 128.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 129; Minnesota Program Development, Inc., Recent Research:
Countering Confusion About the Duluth Model (Oct. 15, 2005), http://duluthmodel.org (follow “Recent Research: Countering Confusion About the Duluth
Model” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 7, 2006).
70. See Sack, supra note 5, at 1669 (examining Minneapolis police
experiment).
71. Sherman & Berk, supra note 4, at 2-3.
72. Id. at 2.
73. Id. at 6.
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than traditional police methods of handling domestic abuse. The
results of the Minneapolis study became a catalyst for reforming law
enforcement’s response to domestic violence.
Following the Minneapolis study, the U.S. Attorney General
issued a report advocating the use of mandatory arrest policies
75
throughout the country. Within a decade, fifteen states instituted
76
mandatory arrest policies. Mandatory arrest schemes freed abuse
victims from bearing the burden of deciding whether to pursue
77
charges and also eliminated police discretion from the decision.
Such statutes also provided increased short-term safety to victims of
domestic abuse by removing the abuser from the abusive
78
situation. While some researchers now question the efficacy of
79
mandatory arrest schemes, multiple studies have demonstrated
that mandatory arrest deters repeat domestic abuse better than
80
other police strategies.
3.

No-Drop Prosecution Policies

Mandatory arrest statutes necessitated a coordinated response
from prosecutors’ offices. Many prosecutors responded with no81
drop prosecution policies.
In many instances of personal
violence, prosecutors give deference to the victim’s decision
82
whether to pursue charges.
In situations of domestic abuse,
83
As a result, few
victims are often hesitant to press charges.
domestic assaults were ever charged or prosecuted prior to the
84
implementation of mandatory arrest statutes and no-drop policies.
By implementing no-drop policies and removing the victim from
the decision to prosecute, prosecutors experienced a significant
74. Id. at 6-7.
75. Sack, supra note 5, at 1669.
76. Id. at 1670.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1671.
79. See, e.g., Janell D. Schmidt & Lawrence W. Sherman, Does Arrest Deter
Domestic Violence?, reprinted in LEGAL INTERVENTIONS IN FAMILY VIOLENCE: RESEARCH
FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 54-55 (Nat’l Inst. of Justice & Am. Bar Ass’n
eds., 1998), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/171666.pdf.
80. Joan Zorza, Must We Stop Arresting Batterers?: Analysis and Policy Implications
of New Police Domestic Violence Studies, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 929, 984-85 (1994)
(examining methodology and results of several mandatory arrest studies).
81. Sack, supra note 5, at 1672.
82. See id. at 1672-73.
83. Id. at 1655, 1673 (examining the prosecution of domestic abuse cases).
84. Id. at 1663-65.
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increase in the number of domestic abuse cases that advanced to
85
Studies also indicated that as prosecution and
the courtroom.
86
conviction rates increased, recidivism rates decreased.
The
aggressive, coordinated response of prosecutors and police to
87
domestic violence has not only raised awareness of the problem,
88
but may also have helped reduce repeat abuse.
The aggressive mandatory arrest and prosecution statutes in
place today reflect a substantial paradigm shift in how law
89
enforcement and legislators view domestic violence. Traditional
police resistance to arrests in domestic violence cases has largely
been superseded by strict statutory requirements for handling
90
domestic abuse. Increased utilization of civil protection orders
and mandatory enforcement mechanisms has improved law
enforcement officials’ handling of domestic violence and has
empowered victims of domestic violence to end the cycle of abuse.
Unfortunately, those critical measures for combating domestic
violence may soon lose their efficacy as a result of the Supreme
91
Court’s decision in Town of Castle Rock.
III. HISTORY OF JESSICA GONZALES’S CLAIM
A. Factual and Procedural Background
Jessica Gonzales’s story is a familiar one to domestic violence
advocates. Her estranged husband, Simon Gonzales, attempted
suicide once early in the marriage when his wife said she planned
92
She waited seven years before she filed for
to divorce him.
93
On May 21, 1999, as part of her
divorce in December 1998.

85. Id. at 1673.
86. David A. Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, The Indianapolis Domestic Violence
Prosecution Experiment, NAT’L INST. JUST. REP. (1993), reprinted in LEGAL
INTERVENTIONS IN FAMILY VIOLENCE: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
62-63 (Nat’l Inst. of Justice & Am. Bar Ass’n eds., 1998), available at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/171666.pdf.
87. See Sack, supra note 5, at 1672-73 (noting increased arrest rates have
altered community perceptions of police response to domestic abuse).
88. Id. at 1673-74.
89. See id. at 1722-23.
90. See id. at 1670-71.
91. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005).
92. Jason Blevins, Dad Attacks Police, Dies; 3 Daughters Found Slain in Pickup,
DENVER POST, June 24, 1999, at A1.
93. Id.
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divorce proceedings, she obtained a temporary restraining order
from a Colorado trial court because she believed herself and her
94
children to be in danger. The order commanded her husband
95
not to “molest or disturb” the peace of her or their children. It
also contained a preprinted notice to law enforcement officials that
police officers “shall use every reasonable means to enforce this
96
restraining order.”
Simon Gonzales was arrested on May 30, 1999, for trespassing
97
in violation of the protective order. Because of the continuing
threat to Jessica Gonzales’s safety, on June 4, 1999, the court made
98
the temporary restraining order permanent. The new terms of
the permanent order provided Simon Gonzales limited parenting
rights, such as the option for a mid-week dinner visit, as arranged
99
by the parties.
The permanent order contained the same
admonition to law enforcement to enforce the restraining order as
100
the temporary protective order contained.
On June 22, 1999, at around 5:00 p.m., Simon Gonzales took
his three daughters from the front yard of Jessica Gonzales’s
101
home.
Jessica alleged her husband’s visit was not a pre-agreed
102
She was concerned about her daughters and
parenting visit.
reported their absence to the Castle Rock police at about 7:30
103
p.m.
Two officers arrived at her house and after reviewing the
104
restraining order, stated that there was nothing they could do.
They advised Ms. Gonzales to wait and call the police if the
105
children had not returned by 10:00 p.m.
Around 8:30 p.m., Ms.
106
He stated
Gonzales contacted her husband on his cell phone.
107
that he had taken the children to an amusement park in Denver.
Ms. Gonzales called the police and asked them to determine
94. Id.
95. Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2800-01. The Gonzaleses had three
children: Rebecca, aged ten, Katheryn, aged eight, and Leslie, aged seven.
Blevins, supra note 92, at A1.
96. Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2801.
97. Blevins, supra note 92, at A1.
98. Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2801.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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whether her husband and children were in fact at the amusement
108
The police declined and again advised her to wait until
park.
109
10:00 p.m. to see if her children returned.
At 10:10 p.m., Gonzales again phoned the Castle Rock police
110
The
to inform them that her children had still not returned.
111
police then told her to wait until midnight.
At midnight, she
went to her husband’s apartment, and upon not finding him or
112
When the
their children, she called the police at 12:10 a.m.
police did not arrive, she went to the police station and filed an
113
incident report at 12:50 a.m.
The officer who took the report
failed to take any immediate action to find the children; instead, he
114
went to dinner after Gonzales left the station.
At 3:20 a.m., bullets began showering the Castle Rock police
115
Simon Gonzales, who had purchased a gun earlier that
station.
evening, had opened fire on the police station in an apparent
116
attempt to commit “suicide by cop.”
Police shot back and killed
117
When police approached Gonzales, they found the bodies
him.
of his three young daughters in his truck, brutally murdered by
118
their own father.
Jessica Gonzales filed a claim in federal court against the Town
of Castle Rock and the three police officers with whom she dealt on
119
June 22, 1999. Gonzales sought damages under 42 U.S.C § 1983,
alleging that the police had an “official policy or custom of failing
108. Id. According to the terms of the restraining order, had the officers
concluded that there was probable cause that Gonzales violated the order when he
took his daughters from their mother’s home, the officers should have issued a
warrant for Gonzales’s arrest. See id. at 2801. When Jessica Gonzales reported his
location at the amusement park, the police should therefore have sought to
execute the arrest warrant. See id. Instead, they did nothing.
109. Id. at 2802.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. Colorado law prohibits persons against whom a restraining order has
been issued from purchasing a gun. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-33.5-424 (2001).
Nevertheless, Gonzales was able to purchase a gun because he lied on his
application and the FBI had no record of the state restraining order. M.E.
Sprengelmeyer, Restraining Order Didn’t Block Gun Buy, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
June 25, 1999, at 5A.
117. Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2802.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2802 & n.3.
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to respond properly to complaints of restraining order
120
Furthermore, she alleged that the custom violated
violations.”
her substantive and procedural due process rights to enforcement
121
of the restraining order.
The city and police officers filed a
motion to dismiss the claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
122
12(b)(6).
The district court granted the motion, finding that
Gonzales had not alleged facts supporting a claim for violation of
123
her due process rights.
B. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals’ Analysis
Gonzales appealed the dismissal to the Tenth Circuit Court of
124
The panel affirmed the rejection of Gonzales’s
Appeals.
120. Id. at 2802. Section 1983 liability arises when state officials, acting under
the color of state law or custom, deprive an individual of her constitutional rights.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Monell v. Department
of Social Services of New York, a municipality also may be sued for damages under
§ 1983 when an official acts pursuant to government custom and violates an
individual’s rights under the Constitution. 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
121. Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2802. A substantive due process claim
arises when one alleges that the State had a categorical obligation that it failed to
fulfill. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195
(1989) (involving a substantive due process claim where petitioner claimed social
services had a categorical obligation to protect the child and failed to do so).
Gonzales initially claimed the State, by granting her a restraining order,
undertook a categorical obligation to protect her, thus creating a substantive due
process interest. See Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 307 F.3d 1258, 1262-63 (10th
Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc, 366 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 125 S. Ct. 2796
(2005). She also claimed she had a property interest in the enforcement of the
restraining order subject to procedural due process protections. Id. at 1264; see
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (clarifying standard for
evaluating procedural due process claims). Not surprisingly, Gonzales does not
appear to have ever asserted an equal protection claim. Such claims have not
succeeded in most jurisdictions. In Ricketts v. City of Columbia, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the city had not violated the equal protection rights of
a domestic violence victim because even if it had a policy of treating domestic
assaults differently from stranger violence, the policy was not motivated by an
intent to discriminate based on gender. 36 F.3d 775, 782 (1994); see also McKee v.
City of Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409, 416 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding no equal protection
violation in domestic assault case); Bruno v. Codd, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 979 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1977) (refusing to dismiss constitutional claims of domestic violence
victims against police department), rev’d 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978),
aff’d, 393 N.E.2d 976 (N.Y. 1979). But see Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F.
Supp. 1521, 1526-29 (D. Conn. 1984) (holding domestic violence victim had
alleged facts sufficient to support a claim for violation of the equal protection
clause).
122. Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2802.
123. Id.
124. Gonzales, 307 F.3d at 1261. The Tenth Circuit remanded without

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006

15

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 1
15CURTIS.DOC

1196

4/5/2006 1:36:54 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:3

substantive due process claims based on the Supreme Court’s
decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
125
Services, which held that nothing in the Due Process Clause
required the State to protect its citizens from the violence of private
126
The Supreme Court noted two broad exceptions in its
actors.
DeShaney holding where a State might have a duty to protect
127
someone from the violence of a third party.
If the State has a
special relationship with the individual, or if the actions of the State
created the danger to the individual, the State may have a duty to
128
protect the individual. In Gonzales, the Tenth Circuit declined to
review the issue of a special relationship and found that there was
no creation of danger by the State, and thus no exception to the
129
DeShaney holding applied.
The court reached a different conclusion regarding Gonzales’s
procedural due process claim. The Tenth Circuit panel, relying on
the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Regents of State Colleges v.
130
Roth, determined that the protective order afforded Gonzales a
discussing the issue of immunity for the individual officers. Id. at 1266-67.
125. 489 U.S. 189. DeShaney was a similarly tragic case. Joshua DeShaney was
placed in his father’s custody after his parents divorced in 1980. Id. at 191.
Despite substantial evidence that his father abused him over the course of three
years, social services failed to remove Joshua from his father’s custody. Id. at 19293. In 1984, Joshua’s father beat him so severely that he fell into a coma from
which he was not expected to recover. Id. at 193. Joshua’s mother brought an
action against Winnebago County alleging that it had violated Joshua’s rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to intervene on his behalf. Id. In its
seminal decision on substantive due process, the Supreme Court held that “the
State had no constitutional duty to protect Joshua against his father’s violence”
and thus its failure to do so did not constitute a violation of the Due Process
Clause. Id. at 202.
126. Gonzales, 307 F.3d at 1262 (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195). The Court
in DeShaney held that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed as a limitation of a
State’s powers, not as a guarantee of safety. 489 U.S. at 195.
127. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201-02.
128. See id.
129. Gonzales, 307 F.3d at 1262. The court did not look at the special
relationship issue because Gonzales did not suggest that the State’s issuance of a
protective order created a special relationship under which the State had a duty to
protect her. Id. The court went through a step-by-step analysis of why the danger
creation theory did not apply, particularly because there was no affirmative
conduct on the part of the police that increased the Gonzaleses’ danger. Id. at
1263.
130. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). Roth was hired as a professor of political science at
Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh for a fixed term of one year. Id. at 566. When
he was informed that his contract would not be renewed, he sued the university
for violating his procedural due process rights. Id. at 568-69. He alleged that the
failure of university officials to give him a reason and hearing regarding his non-

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss3/1

16

Curtis: The Supreme Court's Attack on Domestic Violence Legislation—Discr
15CURTIS.DOC

2006]

4/5/2006 1:36:54 PM

SUPREME COURT ATTACK ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

1197

property interest and the associated right to procedural due
131
process before being deprived of that interest. The Tenth Circuit
reasoned that the use of mandatory enforcement language in the
Colorado statute governing protective orders created an
“entitlement to enforcement of the order by every reasonable
132
means.”
The court concluded that Gonzales had alleged
sufficient facts to pursue a claim that the police violated her
133
constitutional interest in enforcement of the restraining order.
The Tenth Circuit reconsidered Gonzales’s case en banc upon
petition from the City of Castle Rock and the individual police
134
officers involved. The court did not address Gonzales’s claim of a
135
substantive due process right to government protection. Instead,
it focused its ruling on whether the State had afforded Gonzales an
entitlement to protective services that would require procedural
136
due process protection.
The court began by defining the entitlement that had been
137
In its
crafted by Colorado statute for persons such as Gonzales.
analysis of procedural due process, the court wrote that the focus
should not be on property interests created by the Constitution,
138
but rather on those crafted by state law.
The court stated that
“[a] property interest is created when a person has secured an
interest in a specific benefit to which the individual has ‘a

retention violated his right to procedural due process. Id. at 569. The Court held
that because Roth had no interest in future employment, he could not have been
deprived of any interest without due process. Id. at 578.
131. Gonzales, 307 F.3d at 1264-66. The court wrote that a protected property
interest arises when “the regulatory language is so mandatory that it creates a right
to rely on that language thereby creating an entitlement that could not be
withdrawn without due process.” Id. (citing Cosco v. Uphoff, 195 F.3d 1221, 1223
(10th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)).
132. Id. at 1266; see also Siddle v. City of Cambridge, 761 F. Supp. 503, 509-10
(S.D. Ohio 1991) (holding protective order obtained under state law created
property interest subject to due process protections); Coffman v. Wilson Police
Dep’t, 739 F. Supp. 257, 265 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (finding mandatory enforcement
language in protective order created entitlement to enforcement).
133. Gonzales, 307 F.3d at 1266.
134. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir. 2004),
rev’d 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005).
135. Id. at 1099 n.3.
136. Id. at 1099 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t Soc. Serv., 489
U.S. 189, 195 n.2 (1989)).
137. Id. at 1101.
138. Id. at 1099-1100 (citing Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577 (1972)).
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139

legitimate claim of entitlement.’”
The Colorado statute governing protective orders states that a
peace officer “shall use every reasonable means to enforce a
140
protective order.” The Colorado Supreme Court interpreted the
use of the word “shall” in Colorado statutes to “involve[] a
‘mandatory connotation,’” that “is the antithesis of discretion or
141
choice.”
The Tenth Circuit concluded that “the use of explicitly
mandatory language, in connection with the establishment of
specified substantive predicates to limit discretion, forces a
142
conclusion that the state has created a [protected] interest.” The
Tenth Circuit concluded that because the “restraining order
provided objective predicates which, when present, mandated
enforcement of its terms,” the statute coupled with the restraining
143
order created an entitlement subject to due process protection.
The district court found that there is no absolute duty
inherent in the mandatory arrest language because a
determination of probable cause necessarily precipitated arrest for
144
a violation of a protective order. The Tenth Circuit determined,
however, that a probable cause determination is not entirely
discretionary in that it can be measured against the objective
standard of what a reasonable officer would do in similar
145
circumstances.
The court concluded that “an officer’s
determination of probable cause is not so discretionary as to
eliminate the protected interest asserted here in having the
146
restraining order enforced according to its terms.”
The court also provided a careful analysis of the legislative
147
intent behind Colorado’s statute.
Citing a transcript of the
legislative hearings, the court held that “[t]he Colorado legislature
clearly wanted to alter the fact that the police were not enforcing
domestic abuse restraining orders” by creating a mandatory arrest

139. Id. at 1101 (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577).
140. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(3)(a) (2005).
141. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 307 F.3d 1258, 1265 (10th Cir. 2002)
(citing Colorado v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 975 (Colo. 1987)), reh’g en banc, 366
F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 2004), rev’d 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005).
142. Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1102 (quoting Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490
U.S. 454, 463 (1989)).
143. Id. at 1105.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1106.
147. Id. at 1107-08.
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148

statute.
After establishing that Gonzales had a protected interest in the
execution of the protective order, the Tenth Circuit went on to
determine whether the Castle Rock police denied her appropriate
149
process. The court held that “[t]he fundamental requirement of
due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time
150
and in a meaningful manner.’” The court concluded that, taking
the allegations in Gonzales’s complaint as true, “she did not receive
any process whatsoever prior to the deprivation of her interest in
151
enforcement of the restraining order.”
The court defined the
process required by an officer under the statute in three steps: (1)
the officer must determine whether a valid protection order exists,
(2) the officer must determine whether there is probable cause
that the order is being violated, and (3) the officer must determine
152
whether the party violating the order has notice of it. The court
concluded that the officer’s systematic failure to follow this process
153
constituted a violation of Gonzales’s due process rights.
The Tenth Circuit’s holding affirmed a strong judicial trend
towards holding law enforcement accountable for failing to protect
154
victims from domestic violence.
Perhaps more critically, the
holding recognized the mandatory nature of the procedures
defined in domestic abuse statutes. Because the case expanded
potential liability for municipalities, it was ripe for consideration by
155
the Supreme Court.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION
156

Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority,
acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s decision in DeShaney left

148. Id. at 1108.
149. Id. at 1110.
150. Id. at 1111 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (internal
citations omitted)).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1116.
153. Id. at 1116-17.
154. See supra Part II.A.3.
155. The dissents authored by Tenth Circuit Judges Kelly, McConnell, and
O’Brien demonstrate the highly contentious nature of Gonzales’s claims. See
Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1118-45.
156. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer. See Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005). Justice Stevens authored a dissent in which
Justice Ginsburg joined. See id. at 2813-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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unanswered the question of whether state law created an
157
While
entitlement to which due process protections attached.
the Court in DeShaney appeared to leave open a remedy through
procedural due process, Justice Scalia soundly closed it. The
Court’s decision followed two essential lines of analysis in
undermining Gonzales’s claim. First, the Court determined that
the Colorado statute authorizing the protective order, contrary to
158
its legislative history, did not mandate police enforcement.
The
Court also held that Gonzales had no entitlement to enforcement
of the order because there was no adequate way to evaluate
enforcement procedure, and because even if enforcement was
mandatory and adequately defined, it did not create a property
159
interest.
Therefore, the Court concluded that Gonzales had no
160
due process claim against the City of Castle Rock.
A. Assault on Mandatory Enforcement Provisions
The Tenth Circuit held that Colorado’s statute clearly
161
While Gonzales argued that
required enforcement of the order.
the Supreme Court should give deference to the Tenth Circuit’s
162
interpretation of state law, the Supreme Court refused to do so.
The Court held that, while the entitlement may stem from state
law, “federal constitutional law determines whether that interest rises
to the level of a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ protected by the
163
Due Process Clause.”
Thus, the Court refused to give deference
where it did not think the Tenth Circuit’s opinion drew upon “a
deep well of state-specific expertise, but consisted primarily of
quoting language from the restraining order, the statutory text,
164
and a state-legislative-hearing transcript.”
157. Id. at 2803.
158. Id. at 2805.
159. Id. at 2807-10.
160. Id. at 2810.
161. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1101 (10th Cir. 2004).
162. Transcript of Oral Argument at 52, Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. 2796
(No. 04-278); Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2803. During oral argument,
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg both asked Respondent Gonzales’s attorney why the
issue should not have been certified to the Colorado Supreme Court for an
interpretation of state law. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra, at 23-24, 51-52.
163. Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2803-04 (quoting Memphis Light, Gas &
Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978)).
164. Id. at 2804. As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, the Court has a
longstanding policy of deferring to federal court interpretations of the laws of a
state within its jurisdiction. Id. at 2814 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Phillips v.
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While the Supreme Court criticized the Tenth Circuit’s
interpretation of Colorado law, it failed itself to do much more
than quote language from the restraining order and the statutory
text in its analysis of what the Colorado legislature must have meant
165
when it enacted its domestic violence legislation.
The Court
examined the language of the restraining order and the Colorado
statute and concluded that despite its seemingly mandatory nature,
166
enforcement was not truly mandatory. The Court noted that “[a]
well established tradition of police discretion has long coexisted
167
with apparently mandatory arrest statutes.” The Court concluded
that it is simply “common sense that all police officers must use
some discretion in deciding when and where to enforce city
168
ordinances.” For the Colorado legislature to have intended truly
mandatory enforcement, the Court opined that it would have had
to utilize language “perceptibly more mandatory” than any other
169
statute providing that police officers “shall” act.
The Court
emphasized that discretion is necessary where officers are forced to
weigh the circumstances of the violation against the officers’
170
competing duties to enforce other laws.
171
As the dissent persuasively argued, the majority gave “short
Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 167 (1998)). Only in rare cases in which
the court of appeals is clearly wrong in its interpretation of state law will the Court
fail to show deference. Id. Justice Stevens aptly pointed out that the majority did
not even attempt to demonstrate the Tenth Circuit was clearly wrong in its
interpretation of Colorado law. Id. Because the conclusions reached by the Tenth
Circuit were reasonable, Justice Stevens concluded they were “worthy of our
deference.” Id. at 2815.
165. See id. at 2805-07. While Justice Scalia analyzed the meaning of the statute
in light of practical considerations such as when an arrest would be possible, he
failed to examine the social history and unique legislative impetus that prompted
such statutes in the first place. See id. at 2816 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the
majority’s failure to consider many legislatures’ intent to eliminate discretion
through passage of domestic violence laws).
166. Id. at 2805.
167. Id. at 2805-06. In support of that assertion, the Court cited the ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice: “[I]t has been recognized that such statutes [that
seem to preclude nonenforcement by the police] cannot be interpreted
literally . . . . [T]hey clearly do not mean that a police officer may not lawfully
decline to make an arrest.” Id. at 2806. (citing AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1-4.5 cmt. at 1-124 to 1-125 (2d ed. 1980)).
168. Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2806 (quoting Chicago v. Morales, 527
U.S. 41, 62 n.32 (1999) (emphasis added)).
169. Id. at 2806.
170. Id.
171. Justice Stevens authored the dissenting opinion, in which Justice
Ginsburg joined. Id. at 2813-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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shrift to the unique case of ‘mandatory arrest’ statutes in the
172
The legislative history of mandatory
domestic violence context.”
enforcement statutes among the states indicates an “unmistakable
173
goal of eliminating police discretion in this area.”
Given the
legislative goal underlying mandatory enforcement provisions, the
use of “shall” in this statute should be read as distinct from its use
174
in other statutes.
Because Colorado case law did not directly address
interpretation of this statute, the dissent examined how other
175
courts had interpreted analogous statutes.
The New Jersey
Superior Court held that a domestic restraining order allows no
176
discretion with regard to arrest. Similarly, the Washington Court
of Appeals held that in cases of domestic violence, an officer’s
discretion is limited; where the officer has legal grounds for an
177
arrest, the officer has a mandatory duty to make the arrest.
The
dissent observed that it seemed “brazen for the majority to assume
that the Colorado Supreme Court would repudiate this consistent
178
line of persuasive authority from other States.”
The majority’s conclusion that Colorado’s “mandatory
enforcement” provisions were not in fact mandatory is contrary to
179
the history and intent behind such mandatory provisions. As the
dissent aptly noted, the purpose of such statutes was to eliminate
180
Domestic violence was criminalized before
police discretion.
mandatory arrest statutes were enacted; the problem was in the
181
enforcement of the criminal statutes.
State legislatures crafted
new statutes specific to domestic violence to minimize the abuse of
182
discretion in enforcement.
The Court’s dismissal of mandatory
enforcement provisions under the guise of discretion defeats the
172. Id. at 2816.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2818.
175. Id. at 2818-19.
176. Id. at 2819 (citing Campbell v. Campbell, 682 A.2d 272, 274 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1996)).
177. Id. (citing Donaldson v. City of Seattle, 831 P.2d 1098, 1103 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1992)). But see Ricketts v. City of Columbia, 36 F.3d 775, 780 (8th Cir. 1994)
(holding police discretion is key aspect of law enforcement).
178. Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2819 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179. See Rizer, supra note 18, at 5 (discussing the history of mandatory
enforcement statutes); Sack, supra note 5, at 1668-70 (same); White, supra note 18,
at 752-56 (same).
180. Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2817 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. See supra Parts II.A, II.B.
182. See Sack, supra note 5, at 1670.
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purpose of such domestic violence statutes.
The Supreme Court’s interpretation may actually increase the
183
danger to victims of domestic violence.
Mandatory enforcement
provisions within protective order statutes provide significantly
184
improved safety to the recipients of protection orders. Failure to
enforce protection orders may increase violence against recipients
185
of the orders by creating a false sense of security. The purpose of
a protection order is to prevent the restrained individual from
inflicting further abuse upon the protected individual; it is implicit
that the restrained person has already demonstrated him or herself
to be a danger to the protected person. Failing to enforce a
restraining order thus fundamentally contradicts the purpose for
issuing it. The Court’s refusal to recognize enforcement language
as mandatory invites police discretion to once again hinder
enforcement of protection orders, thus creating further danger to
186
victims of domestic abuse.
B. Refusal to Recognize an Entitlement
In addition to undermining the mandatory enforcement
language in domestic abuse statutes, the Court advanced two
additional arguments for why Gonzales did not have a valid
procedural due process claim. Initially, the Court examined what it
perceived as the vague enforcement procedure in the statute and
concluded that it was too indefinite to create an entitlement subject
187
The Court also concluded that any benefit
to due process.
Gonzales derived from the order was too incidental to constitute a
188
property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The majority failed to see how the statutory enforcement
process for protective orders could create an entitlement. Initially,
the Court noted that problems arise when an alleged abuser has

183. See supra Part II.A.
184. See Brief Amici Curiae of National Network to End Domestic Violence et
al., supra note 7, at 21. A study by the National Center for State Courts suggested
that the higher the arrest rate for protective order violations, the lower the reabuse rates for those who had obtained protective orders. Id.
185. Id. at 25 (citing Office for Victims of Crime, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Enforcement of Protective Orders, LEGAL SERIES BULLETIN NO. 4, at 5 (2002)).
186. See Susan L. Pollet, ‘Gonzales v. Castle Rock’: Enforcing Orders for Protection,
N.Y.L.J., July 26, 2005, at 4 (discussing reactions to Supreme Court’s decision).
187. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2807 (2005).
188. Id. at 2809.
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left the scene, making an immediate arrest impossible.
The
Court reasoned that the statute could not reasonably have imposed
a duty to continue pursuing an alleged perpetrator; rather, the
190
duty would have to cease at obtaining a warrant for arrest.
The
Court observed that the indeterminate procedure inherent in the
191
statute “is not the hallmark of a duty that is mandatory.”
The only procedures the Court gleaned from the statute were
to arrest an individual in violation of a protective order or to seek a
warrant for the arrest of an individual in violation of a protective
192
order. The majority argued that “the seeking of an arrest warrant
would be an entitlement to nothing but procedure,” and as such,
193
would be inadequate to create an entitlement.
As the dissent argued, however, “the crucial point is that,
under the statute, the police were required to provide enforcement;
194
they lacked the discretion to do nothing.”
Even though enforcement
of the restraining order’s provisions does not necessarily have to be
195
accomplished through a single method, it still must be enforced.
196
The dissent drew a parallel to state-sponsored health care. While
the provision of health care may involve discretion, “it could not
credibly be said that a citizen lacks an entitlement to health care
simply because the content of that entitlement is not the same in
197
every given situation.”
Fundamentally, questions about the scope of the enforcement
obligation are peripheral to determining whether there exists an
198
entitlement to enforcement.
The Court has found entitlements
199
to a variety of interests, including public employment, a free
200
201
education,
the receipt of government services,
disability
202
203
Some
benefits, and a variety of other government provisions.
189. Id. at 2807.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 2808.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 2819-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 2820.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 2820 n.13.
199. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1101 (10th Cir. 2004)
(citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972)).
200. Id. (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975)).
201. Id. (citing Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11-12
(1978)).
202. Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976)).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss3/1

24

Curtis: The Supreme Court's Attack on Domestic Violence Legislation—Discr
15CURTIS.DOC

2006]

4/5/2006 1:36:54 PM

SUPREME COURT ATTACK ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

1205

district courts recognized an entitlement to police enforcement of
204
a restraining order even before the Tenth Circuit did so.
The Supreme Court’s refusal to recognize an entitlement in a
statute utilizing mandatory language is inconsistent with its prior
205
decisions.
The Supreme Court previously held “the use of
explicitly mandatory language” in conjunction with some standard
to limit discretion “forces a conclusion that the state has created a
206
[protected] interest.”
While it may be true that police have
discretion in how to exercise the provisions in the restraining order
statute, as the dissent noted, they do not have the discretion to do
207
nothing.
Furthermore, determinations of probable cause are not
208
entirely discretionary.
Probable cause determinations are
“evaluated against what a prudent, cautious and well trained officer
209
would believe” under the circumstances. Any discretion involved
therefore should be insufficient to overcome the entitlement given
to Gonzales in the restraining order granted under the statute.
The Court’s final attack on Gonzales’s alleged entitlement
involved the question of whether enforcement of a protection
order can constitute property. The Court held that, even if the
language of the statute did make enforcement mandatory, it did
210
not necessarily create an entitlement in Gonzales. Criminal laws,
including laws that criminalize violations of protective orders, exist
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1108-09 (citing Siddle v. City of Cambridge, 761 F. Supp. 503, 509
(S.D. Ohio 1991); Coffman v. Wilson Police Dep’t, 739 F. Supp. 257, 264 (E.D. Pa.
1990)).
205. See The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Leading Cases, 119 HARV. L. REV. 208, 21315 (2005) (providing an insightful analysis of how the Castle Rock decision departs
from the Supreme Court’s positivist procedural due process precedent).
206. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1102 (10th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 463 (1989) (refusing to
apply the typical mandatory language framework to cases where a prisoner claims
a violation of his or her rights)). The interpretation of mandatory language as
creating a property interest outside the realm of prison cases has continued. See
Cosco v. Uphoff, 195 F.3d 1221, 1223 (10th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
207. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2819-20 (2005)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
208. See Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1105 (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345
(1986) (applying objective reasonableness standard to officer’s determination of
probable cause)).
209. Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 28, Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. 1413
(No. 04-278), 2005 WL 353695 (citing United States v. Davis, 197 F.3d 1048, 1051
(10th Cir. 1999)).
210. Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2808.
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211

to serve public rather than private ends. The Court did not find
any entitlement of enforcement granted to the “protected person”
212
under the statute.
The only power the statute gave to protected
213
persons was the power to initiate civil contempt proceedings.
Because the statute was silent about the protected person’s role in
214
enforcement, the Court declined to find an entitlement.
The Court also argued that even if the statute had created an
entitlement to some benefit, it did not constitute a property
215
interest under the Due Process Clause.
For an entitlement to
qualify as property, it generally must “have some ascertainable
216
monetary value.” An indirect benefit of the government’s action,
217
the Court held, is insufficient to create a due process concern.
As the dissent argued, however, police enforcement of the
restraining order has as much economic value as other government
218
services, such as education or health care. Because “Colorado law
guaranteed the provision of a certain service, in defined
circumstances, to a certain class of beneficiaries, and respondent
reasonably relied on that guarantee,” enforcement of the
219
restraining order created an entitlement in Gonzales.
Analogizing it to a private contract for protection, the dissent
contended that the economic value of enforcement was tangible
enough to qualify as a property interest under the Due Process
220
Clause.
The Court’s dismissal of restraining orders as without
economic value ignores its previous assignments of value. A
comparison between public provision of a service and the cost of
privately obtaining the same service illustrates the value of the
221
entitlement.
Additionally, as the Tenth Circuit illustrated, the
Court has recognized property interests in a variety of government

211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 2809 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(7) (2005)).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 2810 (citing O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773,
787 (1980)).
218. Id. at 2823 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 2824 n.19.
221. See id. (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (comparing cost of
private education with that of public education and finding an entitlement)).
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222

services.
It is disingenuous for the Court to refuse to recognize
an entitlement here where it has done so in comparable
223
situations.
Ultimately, the Court’s holding is very clear about how it views
due process claims such as that advanced by Gonzales. As Justice
Scalia concluded, the Court is unwilling “to treat the Fourteenth
224
Amendment as a ‘font of tort law.’”
Rather, the Court advises
states to craft their own remedy for holding police departments
225
financially accountable for failing to enforce protective orders.
The Court thus refused to recognize any entitlement created by the
restraining order and statute. It also went out of its way to interpret
Colorado’s enforcement provisions as not truly mandatory in
nature. Following the Town of Castle Rock decision, it is therefore
unlikely that victims of domestic violence will have any
constitutional recourse for the police’s failure to enforce protective
orders.
V. IMPACT ON INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF DOMESTIC
ABUSE LEGISLATION
The impact of Town of Castle Rock will certainly be much
broader than just the sphere of domestic violence statutes. The
decision, as the majority notes, seeks to limit claims under the
226
Fourteenth Amendment.
The decision’s effects on the
interpretation and enforcement of domestic abuse statutes,
however, will be particularly significant.
A. Interpretation of Mandatory Enforcement Provisions
Critics of the Town of Castle Rock decision were quick to point
to the potentially tragic effect the decision could have on
enforcement of similar mandatory enforcement laws in other parts
227
of the country. The decision has already resulted in several local
decisions that undermine years of advocacy designed to combat
222. See Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1101 (10th Cir. 2004),
rev’d, Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. 2796.
223. See The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 205, at 214-15.
224. Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2810 (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527 (1981)).
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See Margaret Graham Tebo, Castle Rock Ruling Leaves Advocates Looking
Toward Home, 26 A.B.A. J. E-REP. 1, 1 (2005).
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domestic abuse.
1.

Early Decisions Following Town of Castle Rock

In Starr v. Price, a federal district court in Pennsylvania
considered the case of Joan Starr, mother of Raienhna Bechtel and
228
grandmother of Jacob Bechtel.
On March 14, 2002, Raienhna
obtained a temporary protective order against her husband
229
When police responded to a
Michael following years of abuse.
domestic abuse call placed by Raienhna, they seized several
weapons from her husband Michael before also removing him
230
from the home.
On April 15, 2002, approximately one month
after police seized the weapons, Michael went to the police station
231
to request their return.
The police, contrary to the terms of the
final protective order granted to Raienhna on March 18, 2002,
232
returned the weapons.
On August 15, 2002, Michael Bechtel
used a nine millimeter gun that the police had returned to him to
233
Joan Starr sued
murder his wife, his son, and two other adults.
the police station under § 1983 alleging a violation of due
234
process. The court rejected Starr’s substantive due process claims
under DeShaney, but also relied on Town of Castle Rock to reverse
235
Pennsylvania precedent established in Coffman, thereby refusing
to recognize a procedural due process claim against police who
236
failed to enforce a protective order. The court specifically noted
that nothing in the Pennsylvania statute eliminated police
237
discretion in enforcing protective orders.
Because police had
discretion in enforcing the terms of the protective order, the court
238
held it did not create an entitlement to protection.
228. 385 F. Supp. 2d 502, 504 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 505.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 506.
235. Id. at 509; see Coffman v. Wilson Police Dep’t, 739 F. Supp. 257, 257 (E.D.
Pa. 1990) (holding that court order issued pursuant to Pennsylvania Protection
from Abuse Act vested abused spouse with property right protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); see also supra text accompanying
note 132.
236. Starr, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 509.
237. Id. at 511.
238. Id. This case is a particularly clear example of Town of Castle Rock’s legacy.
The police affirmatively acted in violation of the terms of the protective order by
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Similarly, in Caldwell v. City of Louisville, a federal district court
in Kentucky refused to find police liable for a procedural due
process violation where officers failed to serve an arrest warrant on
239
an abuser before the abuser murdered his girlfriend.
The court
found the facts in that case substantially indistinguishable from
those in Town of Castle Rock and therefore dismissed the case with
240
minimal discussion.
A federal district court in California considered a comparable
protection order case outside the scope of domestic violence
241
legislation.
When relations became strained between Pastor and
Mrs. Majors and some members of their congregation, Mrs. Majors
242
obtained a restraining order against one of the members.
Despite repeated violations of the order and repeated requests for
243
The
assistance by the Majors, the police refused to get involved.
Majors sued the city for failing to respond to their requests,
alleging the failure was linked to the police’s perception that the
244
dispute was “just a bunch of black folk fighting.”
Relying on the
Town of Castle Rock, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ procedural due
process claim because they had no entitlement to enforcement of
245
the protective order.
The unfortunate result of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Town of Castle Rock has been the dismantling of mandatory
enforcement provisions in protective orders. District courts have
read the Supreme Court’s decision as elevating the standard for
interpreting enforcement provisions as mandatory.
2.

Hope in District Court’s Divergence from Town of Castle Rock

Despite Starr and Majors, one federal court has noted that
courts may read Town of Castle Rock too broadly by interpretating
giving back the weapon. Nonetheless, the court refused to recognize the
plaintiff’s claim because the statute was not sufficiently “mandatory” in nature to
provide a claim in cases of police action or inaction.
239. No. 3:01CV-195-S, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20640, at *4-5 (W.D. Ky. Sept.
19, 2005).
240. Id.
241. Majors v. City of Oakland, No. C 05-00061 CRB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15726 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2005).
242. Id. at *4.
243. Id. at *4-5.
244. Id. at *5. The Majors advanced claims of racial discrimination, violations
of substantive and procedural due process, equal protection violations, and
conspiracy to violate their civil rights. Id. at *5-6.
245. Id. at *14-15.
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the decision to elevate the standard for finding statuory
246
The Tennessee court
enforcement provisions to be mandatory.
chose to distinguish the state’s statute from that at issue in Town of
Castle Rock. In Hudson v. Hudson, Jennifer Braddock repeatedly
requested police enforcement of a protective order against her
estranged boyfriend during the course of two years, but to no
247
avail.
James Hudson murdered Braddock, her roommate, and a
friend before killing himself—all in the presence of the couples’
248
six-year-old son.
Allegedly, when the police arrived at the scene
of the multiple homicides, they left the home before actually
verifying the status of any of the victims, considering them
249
“obviously dead” as a result of the “lovers’ quarrel.”
Braddock’s
mother sued the city on behalf of Braddock’s minor child for its
250
Refusing to dismiss the
failure to enforce the protective order.
claim, the court distinguished the statute at issue from that in Town
251
of Castle Rock.
While the court recognized the Supreme Court’s
reading of discretion in the Colorado statute at issue in Castle Rock,
it held that the Tennessee statute “mandates that a police officer
arrest someone when there is reasonable cause to believe that he
has violated a protective order” and therefore that “the arrest is
252
operational, not discretionary.”
The Tennessee court’s holding offers hope for advocates of
domestic violence protection orders. Literally speaking, the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of Colorado’s statute as
discretionary in terms of enforcement is applicable only to
interpretations of the Colorado statute. While it gives a strong
indication of how the Court would rule on similarly worded
statutes, the Court’s decision allows state statutes to be read as
253
evidencing intent of limiting discretion.

246. See Hudson v. Hudson, No. 04-2662-DP, 2005 WL 2253612, at *4 (W.D.
Tenn. Sept. 14, 2005).
247. Id. at *1-2.
248. Id. at *2.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at *4.
252. Id. (citing Matthews v. Pickett County, 996 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tenn.
1999)).
253. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2806 (2005) (“[A] true
mandate of police action would require some stronger indication from the
Colorado Legislature than ‘shall use every reasonable means to enforce a
restraining order.’”).
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Future of Minnesota’s Domestic Abuse Act

Minnesota courts could reasonably follow Tennessee in their
254
interpretation of Minnesota’s Domestic Abuse Act.
The Act
provides that officers “shall arrest without a warrant and take into
custody a person whom the peace officer has probable cause to
255
believe has violated an order . . . .” The statute also provides that
a peace officer acting in good faith to procure an arrest under this
256
statute cannot be held civilly liable.
The statute’s directive that
officers “shall arrest” evinces a legislative intent for mandatory
257
police action under Minnesota’s canon of statutory construction.
Based on the text of the Domestic Abuse Act and Minnesota’s
258
historically aggressive approach to quelling domestic violence,
Minnesota courts could follow Tennessee’s lead and read
Minnesota’s statute as distinguishable from Colorado’s
“indeterminate” law.
Critics might argue that the legislature intended to protect
police in their decisions to enforce, or not to enforce, protection
orders. In addition to exempting officers from civil liability for
enforcing restraining orders in good faith, the statute also provides
that an officer who fails to execute a duty under the statute cannot
259
be held responsible under Minnesota Statutes section 609.43.
That statute provides that a public officer who fails to perform a
“mandatory, nondiscretionary” duty is subject to limited criminal
260
liability for that failure.
Read narrowly, the cross-reference
simply eliminates criminal—but not civil—liability for officers who
fail to enforce protective orders. Read broadly, the cross-reference
might suggest that the duties delineated in the Domestic Abuse Act
are not meant to be mandatory or nondiscretionary. Considering
the text of the statute and the political background pre-dating it,
Minnesota’s courts could nonetheless follow Tennessee’s lead by
interpreting the Domestic Abuse Act’s enforcement provisions as
254. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2004).
255. Id. § 518B.01, subd. 14(e).
256. Id.
257. Id. § 645.44, subd. 16 (“‘Shall’ is mandatory.”); see State v. Humes, 581
N.W.2d 317, 319 (Minn. 1998) (holding that use of “shall” in a statute mandates
specified action); State v. Conger, 687 N.W.2d 639, 644 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004)
(same); County of Dakota v. City of Lakeville, 559 N.W.2d 716, 721 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1997) (same).
258. See supra Part II.B.1-2.
259. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 14(i).
260. Id. § 609.43, subd.1 (emphasis added).
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mandatory.
B.

Civil Remedies for Failure to Enforce Protective Orders

While the Supreme Court left some room for states to define
the nature of protection order statutes, the decision effectively
precluded due process claims against police departments under
§ 1983.
The Court’s three-tiered indictment of Gonzales’s
procedural due process claim clearly indicated its unwillingness to
recognize any constitutional claim against a police department that
261
The Eighth Circuit’s
fails to enforce a restraining order.
precedent had already limited constitutional remedies for victims
262
of abuse prior to the Town of Castle Rock decision.
The realm of
constitutional claims for people like Jessica Gonzales, already
263
limited, is now virtually nonexistent.
The Supreme Court’s decision did not entirely vitiate potential
private actions against apathetic police departments. State laws
often provide limited tort remedies against the state or
municipality. As noted in the Town of Castle Rock oral arguments,
Gonzales could have sued the police officers in Colorado state
court if their failure to respond to her requests for assistance had
264
constituted willful or wanton misconduct.
Colorado’s
Governmental Immunity Act, like the Federal Tort Claims Act and
comparable acts in most states, substantially limits tort actions
265
against the State, however.
The Court ultimately argued that if
Colorado wanted to provide a remedy against police departments
that failed to act, it could do so through explicit exceptions to
266
government liability statutes.
261. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2810 (2005).
262. See, e.g., Ricketts v. City of Columbia, 36 F.3d 775, 781-82 (8th Cir. 1994)
(holding survivors of murdered domestic violence victim did not have an equal
protection claim against police department); Doe v. Hennepin County, 858 F.2d
1325 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding parents did not have a procedural due process
claim against a social services agency that wrongfully removed children from their
home).
263. Ms. Gonzales has now brought her claim to an international tribunal, the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, claiming she has exhausted her
remedies in U.S. courts. Robert Sanchez, International Hearing Sought in Castle Rock
Slayings, DENVER POST, Dec. 28, 2005, at B05.
264. Transcript of Oral Argument at 16-17, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales,
125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005) (No. 04-278); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-105 (2005).
265. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-10-101 to -120.
266. See Town of Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 2810 (noting that while the
Fourteenth Amendment does not provide “a system by which police departments
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While state legislatures could act to craft civil action remedies
as suggested by the Court, the majority of current statutes do not
provide any relief for victims like Jessica Gonzales. Colorado’s
statute, for example, precludes most common law tort liability
against the city or State; individuals may be held liable for their
267
conduct, but are also protected by state immunity.
Additionally,
even if one advances a claim that is not prohibited by the statute,
any judgment collected would be limited to $150,000 per injured
268
person per occurrence.
Minnesota’s statute governing municipal liability is far more
generous to victims of governmental negligence. Municipalities are
269
fully liable for the common law torts of their employees; however,
they are exempt from liability for the execution or failure to
270
execute a statute. For any claims that do proceed, judgments are
271
limited to a total claim of $1 million. For a woman such as Jessica
Gonzales, who lost her three young children as a result of the
police’s apathy, that amount would probably not be sufficient to
compensate her for her loss. Jessica Gonzales may not have found
complete relief even in a plaintiff-friendly jurisdiction such as
Minnesota.
Legislators are left in the difficult position of balancing the
need to compensate victims with the need to limit governmental
liability. As the Colorado statute on immunity notes, more often
than not allowing broad municipal liability may cause greater harm
272
than benefit. Perhaps the most effective solution would be to do
as the Court recommended and craft a statutory remedy for
situations in which the police fail to enforce domestic abuse
273
protection orders. Such legislation could be narrowly tailored to
protect victims of domestic violence without exploding municipal
liability. Ultimately, “legal regimes focusing on the provision of
adequate procedural treatment by police . . . are much more
successful in . . . encouraging victims of violence to work within the

are generally held financially accountable for crimes that better policing might
have prevented, the people of Colorado are free to craft such a system under state
law”).
267. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106.
268. Id. § 24-10-114 (1)(b).
269. MINN. STAT. § 466.02 (2004).
270. Id. § 466.03, subd. 5.
271. Id. §§ 466.06, 466.04, subd. 1.
272. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-102.
273. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2810 (2005).
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system.”
While stricter liability may prompt stricter enforcement
in the future, the focus should nonetheless be on enforcing
275
domestic abuse statutes before liability arises.
The power to preserve the Domestic Abuse Act and similar
provisions elsewhere ultimately lies with state legislatures.
Legislators who fought to enact domestic abuse laws must now fight
to ensure their enforcement. While some courts have already
interpreted state statutes as discretionary in enforcement, state
courts still have the power to define their statutes as mandatory.
The Supreme Court, while refusing to defer to the Tenth Circuit’s
interpretation of Colorado law, probably would have deferred to
276
the Colorado Supreme Court.
It therefore lies with the states to
rectify the federal court’s dismissal of mandatory arrest provisions
in domestic abuse legislation.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is certainly no easy solution to complicated situations
such as that of Jessica Gonzales. It is crucial, however, that courts
not revert to a time when domestic violence was ignored by police
without any recourse for victims. As discussed in Part II, feminist
advocates have fought hard to affect a shift in law enforcement
277
policies from disengagement to strict enforcement.
Civil
protection orders coupled with strong enforcement provisions have
played a key role in reducing violence against women. Despite
stricter laws, however, tragic cases like Jessica Gonzales regularly
slip through the system. While the Tenth Circuit recognized the
importance of holding municipalities liable for such grossly
278
negligent practices, the Supreme Court refused to do so. Justice
Scalia’s opinion for the Court thoroughly criticized Gonzales’s
279
claims.
The Court went too far in its effort to limit government
liability, however. The Court’s determination that mandatory
language was not actually mandatory undermined thirty years of
274. Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Association of Women Lawyers et al.
in Support of Respondent at 9, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796
(2005) (No. 04-278), 2005 WL 328201, at *9.
275. Id. at 8-9.
276. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4-5, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez,
125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005) (No. 04-278) (discussing deference owed to circuit court
interpretation of state law).
277. See supra Part II.
278. See supra Part III.B.
279. See supra Part IV.
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legislative reforms attempting to protect victims of domestic
violence. Further, the Court’s explanations for why the protective
order could not serve as a property interest were contrary to much
of the Court’s existing jurisprudence. The ill-fated result of the
Court’s holding has been the return to a discretionary law
enforcement response to domestic abuse. As a district court in
Tennessee recognized, however, state courts retain the power to
read statutes as sufficiently indicative of mandatory intent to be
280
enforced as such.
Hopefully, Minnesota’s jurisprudence will
follow that lead and continue its long history of aggressively
combating domestic abuse in pursuit of a just society.

280. Hudson v. Hudson, No. 04-2662-DP, 2005 WL 2253612 (W.D. Tenn. Sept.
14, 2005).
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